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The Limits of Eurocentricity


Imperial British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Early Twentieth Century


In The Limits of Eurocentricity, Keith Wilson argues that the British Empire did not reorient itself towards Europe at the beginningo f the twentieth century as has long been assumed.
Publisher: Gorgias Press LLC
Availability: In stock
SKU (ISBN): 978-1-61719-143-5
  • *
Publication Status: In Print

Publication Date: Aug 12,2010
Interior Color: Black
Trim Size: 6 x 9
Page Count: 222
Language: English
ISBN: 978-1-61719-143-5
$138.00
$82.80

Keith Wilson, professor or the History of International Politics at the University of Leeds, argues in this book that the traditional notions of the British Empire’s world view at the beginning of the twentieth century are fundamentally wrong. Wilson does not see 1904 as the point at which Britain refocused on European issues. Instead, Wilson documents how the British did not see Europe as its main commitment in the years leading up to the First World War. Therefore, he concentrates on British foreign and military policy with respect to defending the Empire, whether it be through negotiations with Japan or the necessity of protecting India. He also deconstructs the Anglo-French agreements in the early twentieth century to show that the view of them as great military alliances. Wilson advises against the anachronistic view of a ‘eurocentric’ British Empire.

Keith Wilson, professor or the History of International Politics at the University of Leeds, argues in this book that the traditional notions of the British Empire’s world view at the beginning of the twentieth century are fundamentally wrong. Wilson does not see 1904 as the point at which Britain refocused on European issues. Instead, Wilson documents how the British did not see Europe as its main commitment in the years leading up to the First World War. Therefore, he concentrates on British foreign and military policy with respect to defending the Empire, whether it be through negotiations with Japan or the necessity of protecting India. He also deconstructs the Anglo-French agreements in the early twentieth century to show that the view of them as great military alliances. Wilson advises against the anachronistic view of a ‘eurocentric’ British Empire.

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Contributor

Keith Wilson

  • CONTENTS (page 7)
  • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (page 8)
  • INTRODUCTION: THE LIMITS OF EUROCENTRICITY: The Case of the British Empire 1904-14 (page 9)
  • 1: PROLOGUE TO POLICY-MAKING: Sir Edward Grey and the National Review articles 1901-2 (page 25)
  • 2: FOUND AND LOST IN TRANSLATION: Bertie, Cambon, Lansdowne, Delcasse and the Anglo-French ' alliance' of May 1905 (page 33)
  • 3: THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1905 AND THE DEFENDING OF INDIA: the case of the worst-case scenario (page 45)
  • 4: CREATIVE ACCOUNTING: the place of loans of Persia in the commencement of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (page 67)
  • 5: PASSING ON THE STRAITS: The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in Anglo-Russian Relations 1904-1907 (page 115)
  • 6: SIR EYRE CROWE ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CROWE MEMORANDUM OF 1 JANUARY 1907 (page 133)
  • 7: THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE RE-VISITED, 1906-1914 (page 141)
  • 8: HANKEY'S APPENDIX: inter-service rivalry during and after the Agadir crisis, 1911 (page 175)
  • 9: UNDERSTANDING THE 'MISUNDERSTANDING' OF 1 AUGUST 1914 (page 193)
  • 10: CURZON OUTWITH INDIA: a note on the lost committee on Persia, 1915-1916 (page 201)
  • 11: GENERAL WILSON AND THE CHANNEL TUNNEL before and after the Great War (page 215)