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US Diplomatic Failures and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1967


With reference to final borders, Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem


The United States’ standing in the Middle East eroded as a result of its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1967, with Eisenhower’s “immediate deterrence” proving the lone exception. This period was especially critical as it introduced dynamics into the Middle Eastern balance of power that have proved particularly difficult to address. While the responsibility for seeking an end to conflict ultimately lies with the belligerents, the United States bears a heavy historical responsibility for the course of events and must now constitute the driving force behind a peaceful resolution of the dispute.
Publisher: Gorgias Press LLC
Availability: In stock
SKU (ISBN): 978-1-59333-273-0
  • *
Publication Status: In Print

Series: Conflict and Trade 4
Publication Date: Feb 5,2013
Interior Color: Black
Trim Size: 6 x 9
Page Count: 321
Language: English
ISBN: 978-1-59333-273-0
$192.60
$115.56

A multitude of competing, sometimes contradictory factors created American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1967. Cold War concerns, issues of legality, domestic politics and the impact of the American Israel lobby, sympathy for Israel as a young nation founded in the aftermath of genocide, ambivalence towards the Palestinian population and Palestinian statehood, distaste for certain Arab regimes, and the general pursuit of "right" all contributed. Different factors dominated at critical junctures throughout each presidency under discussion. With so many competing factors, policy formulation largely became a balancing act between the United States’ own objectives and external considerations. Nevertheless, pursuit of American objectives should have been the primary consideration for American policy-makers and diplomats, with the Cold War and strategic requirements the uppermost priorities. Unfortunately this was not generally the case.

The United States’ standing in the Middle East eroded as a result of its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1967, with Eisenhower’s “immediate deterrence” proving the lone exception. This period was especially critical as it introduced dynamics into the Middle Eastern balance of power that have proved particularly difficult to address. While the responsibility for seeking an end to conflict ultimately lies with the belligerents, the United States bears a heavy historical responsibility for the course of events and must now constitute the driving force behind a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

A multitude of competing, sometimes contradictory factors created American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1967. Cold War concerns, issues of legality, domestic politics and the impact of the American Israel lobby, sympathy for Israel as a young nation founded in the aftermath of genocide, ambivalence towards the Palestinian population and Palestinian statehood, distaste for certain Arab regimes, and the general pursuit of "right" all contributed. Different factors dominated at critical junctures throughout each presidency under discussion. With so many competing factors, policy formulation largely became a balancing act between the United States’ own objectives and external considerations. Nevertheless, pursuit of American objectives should have been the primary consideration for American policy-makers and diplomats, with the Cold War and strategic requirements the uppermost priorities. Unfortunately this was not generally the case.

The United States’ standing in the Middle East eroded as a result of its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1967, with Eisenhower’s “immediate deterrence” proving the lone exception. This period was especially critical as it introduced dynamics into the Middle Eastern balance of power that have proved particularly difficult to address. While the responsibility for seeking an end to conflict ultimately lies with the belligerents, the United States bears a heavy historical responsibility for the course of events and must now constitute the driving force behind a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

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Contributor Biography

Candace Karp

For the past eight years, Candace Karp has worked in numerous capacities in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan, focusing on political affairs, and reconstruction and development in state building frameworks. Dr. Karp holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Queensland, Australia, an Honors degree in History from the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and a B.A. from the University of Queensland.

  • CONTENTS (page 5)
  • Abbreviations (page 6)
  • PREFACE (page 7)
  • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (page 11)
  • Chapter 1: THE TERRITIORIAL ISSUES FROM 1947-1949 (page 13)
  • Chapter 2: THE REFUGEE QUESTION (page 73)
  • Chapter 3: THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM (page 109)
  • Chapter 4. THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION FROM 1956-1957 (page 147)
  • Chapter 5: THE TERROTORIAL QUESTION IN 1967 (page 195)
  • Chapter 6: THE REFUGEE DILEMMA (page 239)
  • Chapter 7: THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM (page 265)
  • Chapter 8: CONCLUSION (page 293)
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY (page 297)
  • INDEX (page 311)